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Abstract. Recently security researchers have started to look into au-
tomated generation of attack trees from socio-technical system models.
The obvious next step in this trend of automated risk analysis is au-
tomating the selection of security controls to treat the detected threats.
However, the existing socio-technical models are too abstract to repre-
sent all security controls recommended by practitioners and standards.
In this paper we propose an attack-defence model, consisting of a set of
attack-defence bundles, to be generated and maintained with the socio-
technical model. The attack-defence bundles can be used to synthesise
attack-defence trees directly from the model to offer basic attack-defence
analysis, but also they can be used to select and maintain the security
controls that cannot be handled by the model itself.
Full version of this paper has appeared in GraMSec 2015, to be published
by Springer.
Keywords: Attack-defence trees, socio-technical models, generation of
attack models, generation of defences
1 Introduction
Models are used in all stages of the security process: from security require-
ments elicitation and organisational risk assessment to run-time verification and
business process compliance audit. Often these models are inter-connected. For
example, if a security requirements model for a software system was elicited, on
the later stage it may be re-used to design the security testing process for this
system. At the same time, as manual production of security models is very te-
dious and error-prone, many researchers and practitioners look into automating
the model creation and transformation processes.
Recently security researchers have looked at systematic design [15] and auto-
mated generation of attack models [8], [7], [14], [22], such as attack graphs and
attack trees, from system models. This model transformation allows to switch
the view from the system description perspective to a compact representation of
possible attacker actions. At the same time, given the generated attack model,
the system defender is interested to find the weakest links: the spots in the model
where additional security controls can be introduced to improve protection and
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eliminate potential attacks. Therefore, automated generation of defences is an
obvious next step in the process.
In this paper we look at socio-technical models as succinct abstractions of
large organisations. Such models capture simultaneously locations, actors and
objects in the system. They often take into account both physical and digital
domains and offer to a human analyst the means to represent “the world as it
is”. That means that the designer of socio-technical systems does not need to
be a security or risk analysis expert. She only needs to know the intricacies of
her own company (department) to be able to model it. With the system model
at hand, at the next step the attack generation tools aim at automatic creation
of attack scenarios that can be further discussed by security professionals. The
overall idea of this process is to automate threat scenarios identification (an
important aspect of risk analysis) as much as possible.
In this paper we would like to push the envelope even further. Our main ques-
tion is: given a socio-technical system model, how to find and capture, possibly
automatically, the security controls that will counteract the discovered threats?
Indeed, the main goal of risk analysis is to improve the existing system by in-
troducing new security controls, so that the most dangerous or easily executed
attacks are thwarted. Therefore, automated creation of attack scenarios only is
not yet a full solution.
We want to look at perspectives and limitations of automated defence gener-
ation from socio-technical models. It seems that the main obstacle to rich defen-
sive strategies generation directly from the model is the fact that socio-technical
models do not capture many security controls.
To find an answer to the main question, we start from investigating the
security controls (defences) already present in an advanced socio-technical model
and propose a scheme to extract these controls, together with the attack steps, in
the compact format of attack-defence bundles. We then evaluate the limitations
of the extracted defences inherent from the socio-technical model and discuss
how to overcome these limitations. We argue that an attack-defence model needs
to be maintained (in parallel with the socio-technical model) that can capture
not only the attacker’s view but also the defender’s view of the system. In this
paper we have chosen attack-defence trees [11] as the basis for the attack-defence
model. As an alternative to this model, one can choose, for example, attack-
countermeasure trees [20].
The goal of this paper is to propose an attack-defence view for socio-technical
models that can capture simultaneously attacker’s options and available/pro-
posed countermeasures in the system. The main idea is that given that view it
can be easily synchronised with the model (but it contains richer defence infor-
mation than the model), and it can be used to synthesise attack-defence trees
and evaluate different interesting attributes.
2 Socio-Technical Models versus Attack-Defence Models
As socio-technical models are abstractions, they do not capture all defensive
mechanisms that can be available in an organisation, but only a subset of them.
Indeed, it is impossible to model all security-relevant devices, protocols and
behaviours in a single model. Typically, socio-technical models look at capturing
organisational infrastructure (e.g., [10], [16], [18], [12]), but sometimes they can
focus only on some aspects of human-computer interactions (e.g., [19], [6]).
Since all security aspects cannot be captured by a socio-technical model
without overcomplicating it, we argue that there is a need to maintain a separate
view of attack and defence capabilities of the system together with the socio-
technical model. Preferably, we should be able to trace the objects in the socio-
technical model into the attack-defence model and back.
Requirements for the attack-defence model
The first requirement for the chosen attack-defence model is that the defences
that are already captured by the model need to be represented explicitly in the
attack-defence model. Indeed, we would like to faithfully represent the system
security state. So, if some security control is captured by the system model, it
should be translated into the generated attack-defence model.
Secondly, we want to propose a way to update the generated defender’s view
(the security controls obtained directly from the system model) with more secu-
rity controls and countermeasures of the organisation. This update needs to be
consistent : once a security control is captured in the attack-defence model, it
should be traced to an object in the system model. For example, if our approach
identifies that a security camera is to be placed in a certain location in the sys-
tem, all attack scenarios that involve that location should be updated to take
the camera into account. In this way later on one can investigate automated
defence generation process that will maintain consistency of the socio-technical
system.
Background
In this paper we use the TREsPASS socio-technical model [10] that is graph-
based. We can briefly summarise this model as follows. Locations in the system
represent physical and network locations; actors model humans and processes;
and items can be physical or digital objects. Edges among locations represent
connectedness (e.g., adjacent rooms), and all actors and items are located some-
where in the system. Actors can possess items, and items can be embedded
into other items. Some locations have access control policies attached to them.
These policies specify a set of credentials (items in the system) an actor needs
to possess to enter the location or access the object. These policies can also be
formalized by more complex predicates capturing, e.g., role-based access control
or trust relationships among actors.
As the starting point for the attack-defence model, we consider the process
of attack trees generation by policy invalidation that relies on structural in-
formation about the system [8], [7], [9]. This process was initially designed for
the TREsPASS socio-technical model [10], but it can be applied to other socio-
technical models capturing systems as graphs, e.g., [18], [16], [5], [12], because
it is reachability-based.
In short, this process is started by choosing an asset among the entities in
the system. The attacker is also selected among actors in the system (the main
goal of the attacker is to invalidate the security policy, e.g., confidentiality or
integrity policy, associated with this asset). Then, based on the reachability
reasoning, the process systematically searches for the ways for the attacker to
access the asset. For example, consider the asset to be a sensitive document
located in a locker in the manager’s office, and the attacker to be an insider (an
employee) working on the same floor. To access the document, the attacker can
try to access the locker and open it (an AND-decomposition [11]). This might
require possession of the key to the locker that needs to be obtained elsewhere in
the system. Alternatively (an OR-decomposition with the previous attack), also
the manager has access to the locker and the document. Thus, the attacker can
get access the document by influencing the manager. This can be implemented
through, e.g, social engineering (for instance, befriending the manager, or hiring
an external actor to pretend to be a higher executive who needs the document),
bribing, or coercing the manager.
In this small motivating example we see that two general attack strategies
come into play: the attacker can actively pursue moving across the system and
collecting items that will open him the way to the desired asset, or the attacker
can attempt to orchestrate actions of other actors in the model so that they will
do the necessary actions for him. Irrespectively of the chosen strategy, the pro-
cess of attack trees generation by policy invalidation will systematically identify
available (reachable) steps, add them to the tree, and refine those steps further,
producing a complete attack tree in the end [8]. Notice, that this summary is a
simplification of the overall process, and we encourage the reader to refer to the
original articles about the approach for more details [8], [7], [9].
3 Attack-Defence Model
Extraction of defences from the model
The only security controls the TREsPASS socio-technical model captures are
access control policies that restrict access to certain locations. These policies
can correspond to physical (locks) or digital (password check) means (policy
enforcement mechanisms) implemented in the system to restrict access to assets.
Therefore, we propose to make explicit in the attack generation process the fact
that the attacker needs to overcome the restrictions imposed by security policies.
To achieve that we will use attack-defence bundles that are based on the attack-
defence tree formalism [11].
Intuitively, the attacker can chose from two approaches to deal with secu-
rity policies in the system. He can attempt to satisfy the access control policy
(for example, by collecting the necessary credentials or coercing someone with
the right credentials) or he can try to circumvent the policy (e.g., by forcing the
lock). The first approach is in line with the attack tree generation by policy inval-
idation process, because it can be automatically designed based on reachability.
If we want to refine the second approach, we need to understand how exactly
different policies (more precisely – enforcement mechanisms for these policies)
can be circumvented. There is a need to represent the human expert knowledge
in circumventing different security mechanism in such a way that it is useful for
automated generation process. To achieve that, one can use, for example, the
hierarchical approach to attack representation suggested in [17].
Indeed, the enforcement mechanisms for access control policies defined in
the socio-technical model can be automatically introduced into attack-defence
trees. If the knowledge about breaking certain kinds of enforcement mechanisms
is available in a suitable format (e.g., the hierarchical representation), then the
attack-defence trees can be further refined based on that information. Further
analysis based on the attack-defence trees produced at this stage (e.g., compu-
tation of the most probable or the most cheap attack for the attacker [4]) can
identify the missing enforcement mechanisms. For example, if in the sensitive
document scenario the attacker can directly access the document because the
locker does not require any key (no access control is enforced for the document),
it might be the first recommendation for improving security of the organisation:
to introduce some appropriate access control mechanism (e.g., an actual lock
with the key) to protect access to the document.
3.1 Simplified Socio-Technical Model
We introduce a simplified TREsPASS socio-technical model to exemplify the
attack-defence model creation. The simplified model allows to reason only about
potential reachability. However, this is already very useful for risk analysis, as
quantitative evaluation of the possibility that an attacker accesses some system
elements can simplify risk analysis for human analysts [13].
The simplified model captures simultaneously organisation’s infrastructure
topology for both physical and digital locations, as well as actors moving around
this infrastructure (these can be persons or processes). In the model these en-
tities are represented as a set of model elements N that is a union of a set of
infrastructure locations Ni, actors Na, and objects No. We consider two do-
mains: Ph is the physical space (model elements in this domain are physical
entities, including, e.g. rooms, persons, and items), while Dg is the digital space
(network locations and processes are in this domain), such that N = Ph ∪Dg,
and Ph ∩Dg = ∅.
Some model elements are connected. We denote as E ⊆ N × N the set of
directed connections. All edges e in E are of the following types:
– e ∈ Eii ⊆ Ni×Ni: connections between infrastructure locations (rooms, cor-
ridors, etc.). These connections are assumed bi-directional. More precisely,
if (i1, i2) ∈ Eii then (i2, i1) ∈ Eii.
– e ∈ Eai ⊆ Na ×Ni: placement of actors in the infrastructure;
– e ∈ Eoi ⊆ No ×Ni: placement of objects in the infrastructure;
– e ∈ Eoa ⊆ No ×Na: placement of objects that are carried around by actors;
– e ∈ Eoo ⊆ No ×No: placement of objects that are inside other objects; here
e = (o1, o2) denotes an object o1 located within an object o2.
Mutual intersections of Eii, Eai, Eoi, Eoa, Eoo are empty sets. Elements of the
same domain can be connected liberally. However, some self-evident restrictions
apply when connections between elements of the physical and digital domains
are considered. For example, a data file cannot be located in an office or inside
a cupboard. We allow multiple locations for the same actor and object. This
corresponds to the possibility of actors to move in the model, and represents
that some items can appear in several locations.
We define a location function loc(): N × N as follows: ∀n ∈ N loc(n): =
{l ∈ N |(n, l) ∈ E}.
Notice that for infrastructure locations or actors the function loc() returns
infrastructure locations where these model items are accessible from. However,
as objects can be accessible from actors or other objects, loc() may return any
type of items in the model.
Policies
Let P be a set of policies defined in the model. We consider access control
policies represented as tuples restricting access to element n. The local policy δn is
a set of individual access control configurations. Each access control configuration
p ∈ δn is a tuple 〈Cred, atLocation,EM〉, where Cred ⊆ No is a set of credentials
required to get access, atLocation ∈ N s.t. (n, atLocation) ∈ E is a model
element from which access to n is granted (e.g. access from the office to the
locker is granted with the key in the example in Sec. 2), and EM ∈ N is a
reference to the mechanism enabled in the model to enforce the policy. EM
can be the same as atLocation, meaning that the enforcement mechanism is
implemented right at the spot (e.g., a lock), it can be an actor (e.g., a security
guard checking identity documents or a process implementing access control), or
an object. Notice that we assume that c ∈ Cred ⊆ No is an asset present in the
model, which can be either an item or data.
In theory, different access control configurations of the same local policy δn
can be enforced by different enforcement mechanisms. For example, to access a
building employees might use a badge applying it to an RFID-reader, or they
might show their IDs to a security guard.
3.2 AD-Bundles Generation
We will now show how to generate attack-defence bundles (AD-bundles) that
can be used to capture the attack-defence state of the system. AD-bundles are
generated for individual assets. They consist of attack nodes that correspond to
gaining access to items in the model and attacking these items, and defence nodes
that represent protections offered by the local policies in place. Notice that the
bundles are attacker-agnostic, and they refer only to the system configuration
regarding some particular item. Our notation abuses the standard notation for
attack-defence trees, as we use AD-terms to represent both the tree structure
and to refer to concrete attacker goals. We also define different types of AD-
terms. This is syntactic sugar to ease the type representation, as types are used
to put bundles together and synthesise AD-trees.
Attack node types. We consider attack nodes can be of the following types.
– accessn is an attack node that represents that the attacker gains access to
item n.
– access fromn,l represents the goal of the attacker to access item n from
specific model element l. This node type explicitly states the way n is ac-
cessed in the model, thus allowing us to understand immediately what access
control policy is applicable (by looking at the atLocation attribute).
– breakn represents the goal of the attacker to somehow disable an access con-
trol mechanism implemented in n (this enforcement mechanism can protect
assets not located in n).
– attack polp represents the goal of the attacker to overcome protection of an
individual access control configuration p.
– sat polp represents attacker’s goal to satisfy access control configuration p
(by collecting all necessary credentials).
Defence node types. The defence nodes can be of the following types:
– EMn,l represents the defence of enforcement mechanisms enforcing policies
at l to control access to n (notice that the enforcement mechanism itself can
be located elsewhere).
– pol configp represents protection offered by an individual access control con-
figuration for some p ∈ δn.
Notice that term types attack pol and pol config are required to satisfy the
requirement of AD trees for the unique child of the opposite type [11].
Bundle construction. Let n ∈ N be an item in the model. An AD-bundle Bn
that characterises accessing n is constructed as follows.
We start by setting the root of the bundle to accessn, as this is the desired
attacker’s goal.
Next, accessn is refined:
accessn := ∨p
(
access fromn,l|l ∈ loc(n)
)
// n can be accessed only from an
adjacent element in the model. Any of these elements is suitable for the attacker
If @p = 〈Cred, l, EM〉 ∈ δn then
access fromn,l := accessl // access to n from l can be implemented by simply
accessing l. No access control policy is set up to guard this connection.
If ∃p = 〈Cred, l, EM〉 ∈ δn then
access fromn,l := c
p
(
accessl, EMn,l
)
// access to n from l can be imple-
mented by accessing l. However, as there is an enforcement mechanism that
controls access, the defence node is also added.
EMn,l := ∧o
(
pol configp|∀p ∈ δn s.t. p = 〈Cred, l, s〉
)
// Protection of
access from l to n is implemented via individual policy configurations.
pol configp := c
p
(
attack polp
)
// syntactic sugar to switch back to at-
tacker’s view
attack polp := ∨p
(
sat polp, breaks
)
, where p = 〈Cred, l, s〉 // Attacker can
either satisfy the individual policy configuration p, or he can break the enforce-
ment mechanism s that enforces this configuration p.
sat polp := ∧p
(
accesscred|∀cred ∈ Cred
)
, where p = 〈Cred, l, s〉 // To
satisfy the configuration the attacker needs to access all credentials in the set
Cred identified in this configuration.
We provide an example of an AD bundle in Fig. 1. By construction, for
each bundle Bn its leaf nodes are either terms of the same type (accessl for
some l), or terms breaks. We do not refine terms of the type breaks because the
model itself lacks the knowledge how enforcement mechanisms can be broken. If
an additional knowledge on breaking enforcement mechanisms will be available
(e.g., as a hierarchy of attacks [17]), this term can further expanded.
access_n
access_from_nl
access_l EM_nl
pol_config_p1
attack_pol_p1
sat_pol_p1
access_cred1 access_cred2 access_cred3
break_em1
pol_config_p2
attack_pol_p2
sat_pol_p2
access_cred4
break_em2
access_from_nk
access_k
Fig. 1. An AD bundle.
3.3 Approach to Synthesise AD-Trees
AD-bundles represent attacks on individual assets in the model. They can be
“glued” together to form AD-trees, in the spirit of attack generation by policy
invalidation. In this subsection we outline an approach to synthesis of attack-
defence trees.
The main requirement for AD-trees synthesis is that it should terminate.
Indeed, it is easy to see that any simple loop in the infrastructure will create in-
finite trees if bundles are composed naively. Moreover, some bundles may appear
more than once in the generated tree, creating duplicate subtrees. To avoid this,
we introduce a system state that will keep track of already achieved progress
and will allow to terminate the synthesis process when the attacker has achieved
the goal.
State. We define now two functions that identify the state of the system. These
functions will be updated as the attack tree is generated in order to keep track
with the attack development.
Definition 1 (Reachable(, )). LetM = (N,E) be a model. We define a boolean
function Reachable(, ) ⊆ Na × N :
– If (a, n) ∈ E, Reachable(a, n) := True.
– If for some l ∈ Ni (a, l) ∈ Eai and (o, l) ∈ Eoi, then Reachable(a, o) :=
True.
– If for some l ∈ Ni (a, l) ∈ Eai and (a1, l) ∈ Eai, then Reachable(a, a1) :=
True and Reachable(a1, a) := True.
– Else Reachable(a, n) := False.
This function initially captures for a given actor all items immediately reach-
able in the model. These items can be objects or actors located in the same
location as the actor. Let Reach(a) := {∀n ∈ N s.t. Reachable(a, n) = True}.
Definition 2 (Granted(, )). We define a boolean function Granted(, ) ⊆ Na ×
N :
– If for an item n δn = ∅ then Granted(a, n) := True.
– If for an item n there is a tuple p = 〈Cred, atLocation〉 ∈ δn = s.t. Cred ⊆
Reach(a) ∩No then Granted(a, n) := True.
– Else Granted(a, n) := False.
Intuitively, this function refers to some policy configuration that grants access
to n. If Granted(a, n) = True, then there is a way for this actor to satisfy the
access control policy for n (possibly under condition that he arrives at the right
location).
Let us define a model state.
Definition 3 (State). A generated state for a modelM is a tuple 〈Reachable(, ), Granted(, )〉.
Definition 4 (Accessible(, )). We define a boolean function Accessible(, ) ⊆
Na × N :
– Accessible(a, n) := Reachable(a, n) ∧ Granted(a, n)
Bootstrapping Given a modelM= 〈N,E〉 produced by a modeller, the functions
Reachable(, ), Granted(, ) and Accessible(, ) are initially computed from M.
First we compute a transitive closure of reachable locations:
– Reachable(a, n) := Reachable(a, n) ∨ (∃l ∈ N : Accessible(a, l) ∧((l, n) ∈
E ∨(n, l) ∈ E) )
Notice that here we do not re-compute the function Granted(, ), and thus, even-
tually, the reachable objects set for each actor will increase only with locations
that are not guarded by access control policy. Once Reachable(, ) is recomputed,
it can be used to quickly evaluate whether an actor can reach certain locations
in the original model (where may he end up).
Synthesis of AD-trees from Bundles We now discuss composition of gen-
erated attack-defence trees. An attack-defence tree ADT(η, α) is synthesised for a
chosen attacker η ∈ Na and a target asset α ∈ No. The root node is the bundle
accessα. For each leaf node of the type accessb we can compute its value by
referring to the corresponding AD bundle Bb.
Bundle Value. In the simplest case we use propositional semantics for evaluating
AD-bundles and, eventually, AD-trees [11]. For leaf nodes of the type accessn,
accessn ≡ Accessible(η, n). For leaf nodes of the type breaks, breaks ≡ False
in the current synthesis approach. Thus, given a bundle for asset n, we can
evaluate its value based on the values of the leaf nodes available. By updating the
model state as attack progresses (more items become reachable to the attacker)
we can eventually evaluate the target bundle, once all its descendants become
evaluated. As state changes monotonically, the process will eventually terminate.
4 Introducing New Defences
The enforcement mechanisms for access control policies are not the only type
of security controls that organisations use. Moreover, access control is not the
only remedy that can be advised to improve security. Indeed, the existing risk
analysis standards and security catalogues that guide practitioners in risk analy-
sis identify many types of security controls and countermeasures. Many of those
(for example, security cameras) cannot be captured by socio-technical models
directly, because it will introduce unnecessary complications to the model. Some
countermeasures can be introduced as properties of system elements (e.g., af-
ter a security training the employees might become less susceptible to social-
engineering), but not as independent elements of the system.
We want to be able to update the attack-defence model of our system, cap-
tured by the suite of attack-defence bundles, after the first stage of automated
generation. At this second stage we would like to obtain more complete attack-
defence bundles with new defence nodes added that can capture additional se-
curity countermeasures (either existing in the model already or newly proposed
once). We have two main questions associated with the newly introduced de-
fences: how to generate/propose new defences and where to place them in the
attack-defence model to keep the consistency across many attack scenarios and
system updates. We start by addressing the second question first.
Where to put new countermeasures
Given an AD bundle representing the goal of an attacker to access asset n, two
types of attack nodes are the candidates to be protected from by some coun-
termeasures: the root node accessn and its children access fromn,l. Indeed, for
the connectors to other bundles (the leaf nodes accessb) it will make sense to
introduce defences at the corresponding bundle to ensure the consistency re-
quirement. For the nodes sat polp, the attacker’s goal is to satisfy the policy
by finding the right credentials. It is not obvious what can be done as a pro-
tective measure besides protecting the credentials themselves. As for the nodes
representing circumventing the enforcement mechanism, breaks, we do not have
enough details for the moment how the attacker is going to break it. If this node
is to be refined using some attack pattern library, it is better to create a separate
AD bundle for treating the scenarios and assign defences there.
Now we have candidate attack nodes to be assigned countermeasures. To
select the countermeasures that could be assigned, we first review existing types
of security controls. It is well-established in the security industry to classify
controls as preventive, detective and corrective [1]:
– Preventive controls focus on preventing security incidents from occurring.
– Detective controls focus on detecting occurrences of security incidents.
– Corrective controls focus on aiding the organisation to recover from a security
incident.
From the implementation perspective, it is traditional to divide controls into
the following categories [1]:
– Technical controls that are implemented typically as software controls.
– Management, or administrative, controls that are implemented as procedures
and guidelines.
– Operational controls that focus on ensuring security and dependability of
operations. These controls include physical security controls (physical access
control, fire and water damage protection, etc.) and some controls that are
difficult to classify as fully technical or physical (e.g., protection of personal
computers).
From this classification, we propose a way to update AD bundles with secu-
rity controls in a consistent manner. The preventive controls can be added as
children to the attack nodes access fromn,l, because they correspond to preven-
tive measures for certain directed actions of the attacker. Access control policies
present in the model are already embedded in the bundles at this position. To
satisfy the attack-defence trees requirement of only one child of the opposite
type, we will modify the bundle as in Fig. 2 (now the node Dprevn,l is a parent
of the node EMn,l).
access_n
access_from_nl
access_l D_preventive
EM_nl Other preventive
access_from_nk
access_k
D_detective/corrective
Fig. 2. An updated AD bundle with defence nodes in the designated positions (children
of EM(n, l) not shown).
The detective and corrective measures can be added as children to the root
node accessn (see Fig. 2). In this position the defence nodes are directly linked
to the system object in question, be it a location, a person, or an object. The
semantics of the controls placed in this position are clear: assuming the attacker
has already gained access to his target, is this detectable or what can be the
remedy for this? Notice that some controls in practice can be both detective
and preventive (e.g., security guards). In this case, it is safe to classify them as
preventive controls.
What defences to choose
The choice of security controls is a tough question in practice. Not only it requires
the human analyst to know possible attacks and countermeasures, but also the
analyst needs to solve a complex multi-parameter optimisation problem. Indeed,
the controls addressing the same threat can have different cost, efficiency and
effectiveness. They can be more or less compliant with the industry standards
and best practices. They can be more or less easy to implement and easy to
verify. Finally, they can be more or less desired by the organisation because of
personal views of the top-management. Thus, if we just consider the baseline
controls listed by NIST Special Publication 800-53 [2], and try to evaluate all
the above-mentioned parameters in order to fully automate the defence selection
(now that we know where to place them), we already will face a very complex
problem. Moreover, a single mistake in evaluation of some of the values will likely
make the full analysis invalid. Therefore, it is likely that human-assisted control
selection cannot be fully replaced by automated defence generation, at least for
some time.
Yet, we can try to facilitate the defence selection problem by further cate-
gorising the security controls based on applicability to the scenarios in question
and usefulness in attribute-based computations.
In the socio-technical model we have clear categories of objects: locations,
actors and items that can belong to either physical or digital space. Thus controls
can be chosen based already on simple considerations such as “access to digital
Table 1. Controls selection based on system elements.
Entity Physical space Digital space
Preventive
Location Physical access control Technical access control, firewall
Actor Physical access control, Security trainings, Email filter Technical access control and authentication
Object Physical access control Technical access control
Detective
Location
Security cameras, visitor logs System logs, IDSActor
Object
Corrective
Location Insurance, liability limitation, Insurance, liability limitation,
Actor business continuity plan secure state restoring mechanisms,
Object business continuity plan
Table 2. Relevant controls for example attributes
Attribute Preventive Detective Corrective
Risk of detection
Cost of attack (for attacker)
Probability of attack success
Time of attack
Impact of attack
objects by processes can be protected by using technical preventive controls”, or
“access of humans to humans can be protected by administrative and physical
preventive controls”. Table 1 summarises these choices of controls. In this table,
it is expected that respective controls will be introduced in the dedicated AD
bundles (following the template in Fig. 2).
Furthermore, following the investigation of attribute decoration on attack-
defence trees by Bagnato et al. [4], we can look at what controls contribute
to computations of certain attributes. For instance, if the analyst is interested
in the probability of an attack to succeed, the minimal cost of attack for an
attacker, or time of executing an attack, then (under the assumption that detec-
tion cannot stop the attack) she would like to look at her preventive measures. If
she is interested in the impact the attack has on her organisation (how business
continuity is affected after the attack was executed), she would like to consider
the preventive and corrective controls, especially the latter ones, because these
ensure business continuity. Thus, if she is interested only in some attributes, the
computation on AD bundles does not need to take into account all controls at
once. Table 2 summarises the control types that are the most relevant for some
selected attributes.
Notice that the controls added at this stage will probably not follow the AD
bundle notation, but will be expressed in the natural language (e.g, security
training or ID check). This is understandable, because, as we have mentioned,
models are not rich enough by nature. Yet, this is acceptable for the format, be-
cause the attack-defence model does not need to be fully formal. On the contrary,
it is used to assist the human analyst to create and maintain the attack-defence
view on the system. The only requirement that we have for it is the consistency,
which is ensured by adding each control only to the bundle representing the
attack-defence view of a particular (unique) entity in the model. Some controls
can require a notion of perimeter to be defined in the model, so that they can
be uniquely assigned to the bundle corresponding to the perimeter, and not to
each entity belonging to that perimeter. This is easily implementable in any
socio-technical model.
5 Related Work
The question of attack trees generation from system models has been tackled in
[8]. Similarly, [22] and [14] worked on generating attack models from a system
model. While we follow the same approach for attacker’s view, our main focus
is on keeping both attacker’s and defender’s views consistent with the main
socio-technical model.
Attack-countermeasure trees (ACTs) is an alternative model to attack-defence
trees in keeping both views simultaneously [20]. In [21] the authors have inves-
tigated optimal countermeasure selection for ACTs when a set of possible coun-
termeasures to be implemented is already predefined. It will be interesting to
investigate ACTs suitability for the attack-defence model, because they support
explicit detection and mitigation countermeasure nodes (but not corrective).
In [12] the authors work on directly applying model checking to a socio-
technical model in order to evaluate some reachability-based security properties.
Ferreira et al. [6] have discussed defences suggestion in the context of the
socio-technical model STEAL. They propose to apply defences at the technical
and social levels of the system, what is in line with our proposal for applying
security control categories in selecting defences.
6 Conclusion and the Next Steps
In this work we have approached the question of creating and maintaining the
security controls representation in parallel to the socio-technical model. Our
solution creates a set of attack-defence bundles (small attack-defence trees) that
can be maintained with a socio-technical model as its separate view. The bundles
are generated from the model in the beginning, but afterwards they are enriched
consistently alongside the new security controls identified by a human analyst.
We have also discussed how new controls can be selected based on the model
entities and the attributes of interest to the analyst. This work attempts to bridge
the gap between the approach of automated attack generation from system model
and the manual security control selection in the traditional risk analysis. The
next step is to look into the compositional attack-defence tree synthesis for more
complex attribute domains. After that, it will be possible to investigate optimal
countermeasure selection, based, e.g., on the approaches suggested in [3] and
[21]. Another further research direction is practical validation of the proposed
approach on realistic case studies and evaluation of its usefulness and scalability.
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